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Through the Funnel of Abstraction:
Why Specific Intent Should Be the Required
Mens Rea for Attempted Illegal Reentries
James A. Fortosist
Illegal reentry occurs when a previously deported alien "en-
ters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United
States" without the express consent of the Attorney General.1 An
alien who is convicted of such an illegal reentry can be fined
and/or imprisoned for up to twenty years.2 Despite the poten-
tially severe penalties that are provided for an illegal reentry,
many individuals who are deported each year attempt to reenter
the United States in hopes of reuniting with family and friends,
securing employment, or for a host of other reasons. 3 This num-
ber of illegal reentrants grew dramatically during the 1990s.4
One issue in illegal reentry law that currently remains unre-
solved is whether an attempted illegal reentry, pursuant to 8
USC § 1326(a), is a crime requiring specific intent or general in-
tent. This confusion is precipitated because in 8 USC § 1326, the
crime of attempted illegal reentry is described without an explicit
reference to the required mens rea. The majority position,
adopted by the First, 5 Second,6 Fifth, 7 and Eleventh Circuits,8
holds that attempted illegal reentry requires only general intent.
t B.A. 2005, Wheaton College, IL; J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Chicago.
1 8 USC § 1326(a) (2000).
2 8 USC § 1326(a)-(b) (2000).
3 See Bill Wallace, Deported Criminals Stream Back Into the U.S. by the Thousands,
San Fran Chron All (May 11, 1998) (estimating that in 1997, in San Diego alone, the
United States Attorney's office prosecuted over 1,600 § 1326 reentry cases).
4 Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States Department of Justice Sourcebook of
Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table No 5.76.2004, available at <http://www.
albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5762004.pdf> (last visited Apr 27, 2007) (noting 444 convic-
tions for reentries of deported aliens in 1990, 1,475 convictions in 1995, and 4,759 convic-
tions for reentries in 2000).
5 United States v Reyes-Medina, 1995 WL 247343, *1-2 (1st Cir).
6 United States v Rodriguez, 416 F3d 123, 125 (2d Cir 2005).
7 United States v Morales-Palacios, 369 F3d 442, 449 (5th Cir 2004).
8 United States v Peralt-Reyes, 131 F3d 956, 957 (11th Cir 1997).
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On the other side of the split, the Ninth Circuit holds that spe-
cific intent is required for conviction of an attempted illegal reen-
try.9 In essence, the disagreement between the majority position
and the Ninth Circuit is one of statutory interpretation, in par-
ticular, disagreement over how the word "attempt" in 8 USC
§ 1326 should be interpreted. 10
This Comment focuses specifically on the disagreement in
reasoning between the Ninth Circuit in United States v Graci-
das-Ulibarry" and the Second Circuit in United States v Rodri-
guez,12 because Gracidas-Ulibarry provides the most comprehen-
sive discussion of the minority position, while the Rodriguez
opinion is the most recent broad articulation of the majority posi-
tion.
Because the circuit split is based on differing statutory in-
terpretation, this Comment offers a resolution to the split by
providing a more comprehensive statutory interpretation of
§ 1326 and the word "attempt" than either the Gracidas- Ulibarry
or Rodriguez courts provide in their respective opinions. This
comprehensive statutory interpretation is based upon the model
advocated by Professors Eskridge and Frickey in their seminal
article on practical statutory interpretation, Statutory Interpreta-
tion as Practical Reasoning.13 This Comment will employ this
practical reasoning model because it most resembles the actual
practice of the United States Supreme Court.14
9 United States v Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F3d 1188, 1190 (9th Cir 2000). Although no
other circuit has held that attempted illegal reentry is a crime requiring specific intent,
the Eighth Circuit recently cited with approval the Gracidas-Ulibarry finding that statu-
tory attempt crimes require specific intent "[aibsent an indication that Congress intended
a different meaning." United States v Kenyon, 2007 WL 1039551, *12 (8th Cir). This dis-
cussion in Kenyon suggests that if an attempted illegal reentry case were to come before
the Eighth Circuit they may be inclined to join the minority position.
10 8 USC § 1326(a)(2000) ("[A]ny alien who-(1) has been denied admission, excluded,
deported, or removed or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, de-
portation, or removal is outstanding, and thereafter (2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at
any time found in, the United States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place
outside the United States or his application for admission from foreign contiguous terri-
tory, the Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for admis-
sion ... shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.").
11 231 F3d 1188 (9th Cir 2000).
12 416 F3d 123 (2d Cir 2005).
13 William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practi-
cal Reasoning, 42 Stan L Rev 321, 321 (1990) (suggesting that, as a descriptive matter,
judges' approach to statutory interpretation is eclectic, not inspired by "grand theory.").
14 See Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Em-
pirical Analysis, 70 Tex L Rev 1074, 1136 (1992) (arguing that the Supreme Court is
"eclectic" in its choice of sources in statutory construction cases).
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This Comment is divided into four parts. Part I provides the
legal landscape and describes the split that has developed be-
tween the circuits. Part II presents a general background on the
"grand theories" of statutory interpretation. Additionally, this
section lays out the "practical reasoning" framework advocated
by Eskridge and Frickey. Part III argues that both the Gracidas-
Ulibarry and Rodriguez courts implicitly adopt one of the "grand
theories" of statutory construction (or a hybrid of the grand theo-
ries). This Part contends that the Gracidas- Ulibarry court ap-
proaches its interpretation of § 1326 from a new textualist
standpoint while the Rodriguez court approaches its interpreta-
tion using an intentionalist/purposive framework. Part IV pro-
vides a more comprehensive statutory interpretation of § 1326
using Eskridge and Frickey's "funnel of abstraction" as a model
through which to filter and compare various sources of statutory
interpretation. This Part concludes that based upon the "totality
of sources" the minority opinion is in fact correct and that specific
intent ought to be the required mens rea for a § 1326 attempted
illegal reentry.
I. SUMMARY OF THE LEGAL CONFLICT
Section 276 of The Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA"), 15 codified at 8 USC § 1326, provides criminal sanctions
for an alien who has been denied admission, deported, excluded
or removed, or who has left the United States while an order of
exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding and later en-
ters, attempts to enter, or is found in the United States without
the express consent of the Attorney General to the alien's read-
mission.16
All circuits that have interpreted this section have found
only general intent is required for liability under § 1326 if the
alien has "entered" or been "found in" the United States. 17 For
15 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub L No 82-414, 66 Stat 163 (1952), codified at
8 USC §§ 1101-1537 (2000).
16 8 USC § 1326(a) (2000). Consider Kurtis A. Kemper, Illegal Reentry Under § 276 of
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1326) of Alien Who Has Been Denied Ad-
mission, Excluded, Deported, or Removed or Has Departed United States While Order of
Exclusion, Deportation, or Removal Is Outstanding, 177 Am L Rep Fed 459 (2006) (pro-
viding a general overview of 8 USC § 1326).
17 See United States v Carlos-Colmenares, 253 F3d 276, 278 (7th Cir 2001); United
States v Guzman-Ocampo, 236 F3d 233, 237 (5th Cir 2000); United States v Gutierrez-
Gonzalez, 184 F3d 1160, 1165 (10th Cir 1999); United States v Martus, 138 F3d 95, 97 (2d
Cir 1998) (per curiam); United States v Peralt-Reyes, 131 F3d 956, 957 (11th Cir 1997)
(per curiam); United States v Gonzalez-Chavez, 122 F3d 15, 17 (8th Cir 1997); United
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example, the Ninth Circuit in Pena-Cabanillas v United States8
found that 8 USC § 1326 contained no "language inferring in-
tent,"19 concluding:
The government need only prove that the accused is an
alien and that he illegally entered the United States after
being deported according to law. An allegation of willful-
ness is unnecessary in an indictment under 8 U.S.C. Sec.
1326.... [The presence in the country itself is the conduct
which Congress has seen fit to punish.20
The other circuits that have addressed this particular issue have
more or less shared the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Pena-
Cabanillas.21
While the circuits are generally in agreement on the mens
rea required for an actual illegal reentry, the mens rea needed
for conviction of an attempted illegal reentry has split the cir-
cuits. The Ninth Circuit in Gracidas-Ulibarry found that at-
tempted illegal reentry was a specific intent crime, which re-
quires that "the defendant [have] the purpose, i.e., conscious de-
sire, to reenter the United States without the express consent of
the Attorney General."22 The Ninth Circuit's mens rea standard
requires the government, in an attempted reentry case, to prove
that the alien possessed a dual intent: (1) the intent to reenter
the United States; and (2) the intent to do so "without the ex-
press consent of the Attorney General," in other words, the intent
to reenter the United States illegally.23 Presumably this would
mean that an alien who attempts to enter the United States with
the subjective good-faith belief that he is doing so with the ex-
States v Soto, 106 F3d 1040, 1040 (1st Cir 1997); United States v Leon-Leon, 35 F3d 1428,
1432-33 (9th Cir 1994); United States v Espinoza-Leon, 873 F2d 743, 746 (4th Cir 1989);
United States v Hussein, 675 F2d 114, 115-16 (6th Cir 1982) (per curiam).
18 394 F2d 785 (9th Cir 1968).
19 Id at 789.
20 Id (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
21 See, for example, United States v Gonzalez-Chavez, 122 F3d 15, 17 (8th Cir 1997)
('We agree with those courts that have held that specific intent is not an element of the
offense [of being found in the United States] in § 1326 prosecutions. Section 1326 is silent
on the issue of criminal intent, and while statutory silence alone does not necessarily
dictate that intent is not an element of the stated crime, nothing in the legislative history
of § 1326 supports inferring an element of specific intent.") (citations omitted).
22 231 F3d at 1196.
23 Consider Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law 384 (Lexis 3d ed 2001)
(suggesting that the mens rea for criminal attempts requires a dual intent: (1) the intent
to commit the acts that constitute the actus reus; and (2) the specific intention of perform-
ing the target crime).
506 [2007:
503] THROUGH THE FUNNEL OF ABSTRACTION 507
press consent of the Attorney General could not be convicted for
an attempted illegal reentry pursuant to 8 USC § 1326(a).24
The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion regarding specific
intent, in large part, because it reasoned that the word "attempt"
in § 1326 should retain its common law meaning.25 Under the
common law, an attempt was defined as "[a]n overt act that is
done with the intent to commit a crime but falls short of complet-
ing the crime." 26 Generally, attempt crimes require the defendant
to possess a higher mens rea than completed crimes because at-
tempt crimes lack a completed actus reus.27 Those who defend
this formulation argue that the heightened intent requirement is
appropriate because it separates the "heightened dangerousness
of intentional wrongdoers" who are likely to attempt the crime
again in the future from those who are simply reckless or negli-
gent in their actions. 28 This understanding fits well with the rea-
soning of the Gracidas-Ulibarry court, which expressed concern
over limiting criminal sanctions for attempted reentries to those
persons who intended to break the law and were likely to at-
tempt do so again in the future. 29
All other circuits that have been presented with the issue
have declined to share the Ninth Circuit's commitment to the
common law reading of "attempt."30 In Rodriguez, the Second
24 See Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F3d at 1196 ('The practical difference between [gen-
eral and specific intent] ... is that certain defenses, such as voluntary intoxication and
subjective mistake offact, can negate culpability only for specific intent crimes.") (empha-
sis added).
25 Id at 1192 ('CThe common law meaning of 'attempt' is the specific intent to engage
in criminal conduct and.., an overt act which is a substantial step towards committing a
crime.").
26 Black's Law Dictionary 137 (West 8th ed 2004) (emphasis added).
27 See Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F3d at 1193 ('The reason for requiring specific intent
for attempt crimes is to resolve the uncertainty whether the defendant's purpose was
indeed to engage in criminal, rather than innocent, conduct. This uncertainty is not pre-
sent when the defendant has completed the underlying crime, because the completed act
is itself culpable conduct.") (citations omitted).
28 See Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law at 386 (cited in note 23) (discussing
the rationale for requiring specific intent in attempt crimes).
29 Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F3d at 1194 ("Congress may have had good reason to in-
corporate the common law meaning of attempt into the crime of attempted illegal reentry
under § 1326 .... [Oltherwise, lawful conduct could be swept up within the proscription of
the statute .... If attempted illegal reentry were a general intent crime, a previously
deported alien intercepted on the way to, or even at, the port of entry to make [a request
to reapply for admission to the United States] could be prosecuted under § 1326. True, the
alien could try to explain that his or her intent was to comply with the law, not to violate
it; but the government would not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alien's
true purpose was to break the law.").
30 Rodriguez, 416 F3d at 125; United States v Morales-Palacios, 369 F3d 442, 449
(5th Cir 2004); United States v Peralt-Reyes, 131 F3d 956, 957 (11th Cir 1997); United
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Circuit held that "the offense of attempted illegal reentry under
§ 1326(a) does not require the government to allege or prove that
the defendant had the specific intent to reenter the United
States without the expressed permission of the Attorney Gen-
eral" because "nothing about the nature of the offense as an 'at-
tempt' crime, rather than a completed crime, requires proof of
specific intent. '31 Thus, under the Second Circuit's mens rea for-
mulation, the government is only required to prove that an alien
possessed the intent to enter the United States, and need not
prove that the alien possessed the intent to enter illegally.32
The Second Circuit premised this general intent formulation
on § 1326's regulatory nature. The Rodriguez court argued that
since § 1326 was a statutory crime, and did not "enshrin[e] in
statute a common law offense" the word attempt was 'liberated
from [its] common law meaning. '' 33 The court's reasoning was
based primarily on the Supreme Court's holding in United States
v Balint,34 which had adopted an exception to the general rule
that statutory crimes required an adoption of the scienter just as
did common law offenses.3 5 In light of the regulatory nature of
§ 1326 and based on the language of Balint, the Second Circuit
held that a general intent standard was most in line with "pre-
serv[ing] the purpose[] that the statute [was] meant to achieve"36
and reflected "Congress's 'broad discretion in defining offenses in
the area of immigration. '"'3 7
States v Reyes-Medina, 1995 WL 247343 (1st Cir).
31 Rodriguez, 416 F3d at 125.
32 Id at 128 ("[Ihe statute [8 USC § 1326(a)] does not require the government to
allege or prove either that Rodriguez knew that he needed the permission of the Attorney
General to reenter or that he knew that he did not have that permission when he inten-
tionally attempted to reenter."). See also Morales-Palacios, 369 F3d at 449 ("[W]e join the
majority of circuits holding that for an attempted illegal reentry under section 1326 spe-
cific intent is not an element of the statute. We also note that in proving an attempted
illegal reentry it is sufficient that the government demonstrates that a previously de-
ported alien knowingly intended to reenter the United States-general intent with respect
to the actus reus of the crime.").
33 416 F3d at 126. See also Morales-Palacios, 369 F3d at 447 (providing a thorough
discussion of the difference between common law offenses and regulatory offenses).
34 258 US 250 (1922).
35 Id at 251-52 ("While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a
necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime, and this was followed in
regard to statutory crimes even where the statutory definition did not in terms include it,
there has been a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the
purpose of which would be obstructed by such a requirement. It is a question of legislative
intent to be construed by the court.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
36 Rodriguez, 416 F3d at 128.
37 Id at 126, quoting United States v Newton, 677 F2d 16, 17 (2d Cir 1982).
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Other circuits that have adopted the majority position advo-
cated by the Second Circuit in Rodriguez have advanced similar
reasoning. In United States v Morales-Palacios,38 the Fifth Cir-
cuit emphasized § 1326's regulatory nature, noting that it was
not persuaded by the common law arguments made by the Ninth
Circuit in Gracidas-Ulibarry "because imputing common-law
meaning of elements of crimes into statutes is compelling only
with respect to traditional crimes as distinct from regulatory of-
fenses. '39 Since the Fifth Circuit did not believe an attempted
illegal reentry pursuant to § 1326 was a common law offense, it
found that it must "exhibit extreme caution" in allowing defen-
dants charged with regulatory crimes to invoke a mistake of fact
defense "where the mere illegal conduct may seriously threaten
the community's health or safety."40
As the discussion above indicates, the continuing disagree-
ment between the Gracidas-Ulibarry position and the majority
position advocated in Rodriguez and Morales-Palacios is a dis-
agreement over the means, methods, and sources of statutory
interpretation, specifically the interpretation of "attempt" in 8
USC § 1326. On the one hand, the Gracidas-Ulibarry court is
concerned with remaining faithful to the common law meaning of
attempt, while the Rodriguez court and the other courts compris-
ing the majority are concerned with Congress's intentions and
the purposes behind § 1326.
II. "GRAND THEORIES" & PRACTICAL REASONING
In the mid-20th century Professors Hart and Sacks observed
that "[t]he hard truth of the matter is that American courts have
no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied the-
ory of statutory interpretation.' l In the wake of these astute ob-
servations, academics and judges have put forth a "cascade of
statutory interpretation theories" over the last twenty years42
38 369 F3d 442 (5th Cir 2004).
39 Id at 447.
40 Id at 448, quoting Staples v United States, 511 US 600, 611 (1994).
41 Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 1169 (Foundation 1994).
42 Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory Inter-
pretation, 30 J Legis 1, 3 (2003). See also Gregory Scott Crespi, The Influence of a Decade
of Statutory Interpretation Scholarship on Judicial Rulings: An Empirical Analysis, 53
SMU L Rev 9, 23-29 (2000) (providing a bibliography of articles discussing different theo-
ries of statutory construction that were published between 1988-1997).
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These theories range from the textual theories of Justice Scalia43
and Judge Easterbrook, 44 to the "Imaginative Reconstruction"
advocated by Judge Posner in the early 1980s, 45 to the Legal
Process method advocated by Hart and Sacks themselves. 46 De-
spite this "cascade of statutory interpretation theories," three
general theories or "grand theories" have retained significant
influence: textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism.
A. Textual: New Textualism
One of the most prominent "grand theories" of statutory in-
terpretation is new texualism. 47 New textualists argue that when
the words of a statute are clear, judges should resolve the con-
tested issue on the statute's "plain meaning" alone. 48 In addition
to examining the text, new textualists like Justice Scalia are
willing to look to the overall statutory structure, dictionaries,
similar statutes, and certain canons of statutory construction to
aid in interpreting a statute.49 Thus, new textualist statutory
construction is premised on the text of the statute in question,
considering and interpreting the meaning of a word in light of
the sentence, section, act, code, and law generally in which it ap-
pears.
43 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton
1997).
44 Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 Harv
J L & Pub Pol 87 (1984).
45 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Court-
room, 50 U Chi L Rev 800, 817 (1983).
46 Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process (cited in note 41).
47 Consider William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L Rev 621, 656
(1990) (providing an overview of new textualism, and noting that "In each year that Jus-
tice Scalia has sat on the Court ... his [new textualist] theory has exerted greater influ-
ence on the Court's practice.").
48 See INS v Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia concurring in judg-
ment) ("Although it is true that the Court in recent times has expressed approval of this
doctrine [that legislative history can sometimes trump plain meaning], that is to my mind
an ill-advised deviation from the venerable principle that if the language of a statute is
clear, that language must be given effect-at least in the absence of a patent absurdity.").
49 See Green v Bock Laundry Co, 490 US 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia concurring in judg-
ment) (arguing that the meaning of statutory terms ought to be determined (a) in accor-
dance with their ordinary use and (b) in ways "most compatible with the surrounding
body of law"). See also Eskridge, 37 UCLA L Rev at 623-24 (cited in note 47) (stating that
the meaning of a particular statutory word or phrase is confirmed "from an examination
of the structure of the statute, interpretations given similar statutory provisions, and
canons of statutory construction."); Robert J. Araujo, The Use of Legislative History in
Statutory Interpretation: A Look at Regents v. Bakke, 16 Seaton Hall Leg J 57, 73 (1992)
(stating that a new textualist will "examined not only the specific statutory language
which is the subject of the litigation, but the entire statute as reflected by other legisla-
tion enacted by the same legislature.").
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B. Contextual: Intentionalism & Purposivism
Unlike new textualism, two of the "grand theories" of statu-
tory interpretation, intentionalism and purposivism, can be clas-
sified as contextual. 50 A particularly succinct formulation of con-
textualism appears in Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP v
Bargas,51 where the Colorado Supreme Court noted that courts
interpreting statutes should first look to the "plain and ordinary
meaning of the statute," but if the meaning is still unclear should
look to the "object the legislature sought to obtain by its enact-
ment, the circumstances under which it was adopted, the legisla-
tive history of the statute, and the legislative declaration or pur-
pose."52
One branch of contextual interpretation, intentionalism,
seeks to resolve statutory ambiguity by discerning the intentions
of the legislature that passed the statute in question.5 3 As Park
County suggests, intentionalists, like new textualists, begin their
interpretive inquiry with the actual text; if that text offers a
plain meaning, then the inquiry is over. However, statutory
meanings that are unambiguous are almost never litigated,
therefore this adherence to the "plain meaning" rule is often a
perfunctory step in the interpretative process5 4
Step two is where textualism and intentionalism diverge.
While new textualists rely on certain extrinsic sources, such as
dictionaries, other statutes, and the common law, intentionalists
often rely heavily on the legislative history of a statute in an at-
tempt to determine the "intent" of the enacting legislature. 55
50 To classify these two theories as contextual does not mean that they ignore the
text, or general statutory scheme; rather, they are contextual in the sense that they con-
sider a broader universe of sources than simply the text. See Robert J. Martineau, Craft
and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Inter-
pretation, 62 Geo Wash L Rev 1, 9 (1993) ("[Textualism focused on the words of a statute
and contextualism embraced either the intent approach or the purpose approach.") (em-
phasis added).
51 986 P2d 262 (Colo 1999).
52 Id at 268.
53 Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 325 (cited in note 13) ("Under [intentional-
ism], the Court acts as the enacting legislature's faithful servant, discovering and apply-
ing the legislature's original intent.").
54 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,
17 Harv J L & Pub Pol 61, 61 (1994) ("All judges follow a simple rule: when the statute is
clear, apply it. But people rarely come to court with clear cases. Why waste time and
money? People come to court when texts are ambiguous, or conflict, or are so old that a
once-clear meaning has been lost.").
55 At present there are three major formulations of intentionalist theory: (1) actual,
(2) conventional, and (3) imaginative reconstruction. A number of articles discuss these
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The second contextual "grand theory" of statutory construc-
tion is purposivism. Purposivism appeared in the wake of legal
realist critiques of intentionalism, 56 and was expanded by Profes-
sors Hart and Sacks into a theory that sought to be faithful to
the enacting legislature by discovering the ultimate purpose of
any particular act.57 Purposivism in statutory construction is
most often used in cases of apparent textual ambiguity when a
judge believes that the words of the statute alone are not enough
to determine the true meaning of the language in question, or
when the purposes of the statute would be negated by following
the plain meaning of the text.58
As the above overview of the "grand theories" demonstrates,
textual and contextual theories of statutory interpretation all
have the same end goal of faithful statutory interpretation. The
difference between the theories is how they arrive at that faithful
interpretation. On the one hand, new textualists believe faithful
interpretation requires the judge to remain true to the actual
words of the statute (or broader statutory scheme), using only a
limited universe of sources to reach their goal. On the other
hand, contextualists, including both intentionalists and pur-
posivists, believe that faithful interpretation means finding the
various formulations of intentionalism; however, for this Comment's purposes simply
understanding that intentionalism is focused upon the intentions of the enacting legisla-
ture is sufficient. See, for example, Martineau, 62 Geo Wash L Rev at 16 (cited in note 50)
(discussing the three formulations of intentionalism); Araujo, 16 Seton Hall Leg J at 85-
86 (cited in note 49) (discussing the use of legislative history in interpreting statutes);
Posner, 50 U Chi L Rev at 817-18 (cited in note 45) (describing in detail the "imaginative
reconstruction" intentionalist approach).
56 See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv L Rev 863, 870-71 (1930). See
also Martineau, 62 Geo Wash L Rev at 10 (cited in note 50) (describing realist critique of
intentionalism).
57 Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process (cited in note 41). According to Hart and Sacks
"every statute must be conclusively presumed to be a purposive act." Id at 1124. Since
"every statute and every doctrine of unwritten law developed by the decisional process
has some kind of purpose or objective" the primary goal of statutory interpretation should
be to discern what that purpose is, and in turn, to resolve statutory ambiguities so they
are most in line with the statute's determined purpose. Id at 148.
58 See, for example, United Steelworkers v Weber, 443 US 193, 201-02 (1979) (using
legislative history and historical context to determine that a literal reading of §§ 703(a)
and (d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "would bring about an end completely at variance
with the purpose of the statute and must be rejected.") (quotation omitted); Church of the
Holy Trinity v United States, 143 US 457, 459 (1892) ("[Flrequently words of general
meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet
a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enact-
ment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words,
makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular
act.").
THROUGH THE FUNNEL OF ABSTRACTION
enacting legislature's true intentions or the true purpose of the
statute through a broad universe of interpretative sources.
C. Practical Reasoning
Despite the continued use of these "grand theories" in statu-
tory construction, they have come under attack, both normatively
and descriptively, by a number of scholars.5 9 In particular, Wil-
liam Eskridge and Philip Frickey have argued that judges should
not be beholden to grand theories like textualism, intentional-
ism, or purposivism. Instead, judges should advocate practical
reasoning, whereby a court would critically look at and compare
the totality of sources in construing a statute.60
Eskridge and Frickey advocate this practical model in large
part because they find each of the "grand theories" lacking in
some way.61 In order to remedy the problems they find in each of
the "grand theories," Eskridge and Frickey posit a comprehensive
model of statutory construction that embodies inquiries into all
available and relevant sources. To implement their comprehen-
sive theory of "practical reasoning," Eskridge and Frickey sug-
gest a model through which courts can apply "primary eviden-
tiary inquiries" before coming to a conclusion about the meaning
of a particular statutory word or phrase. 62 This model, dubbed by
Eskridge and Frickey the "funnel of abstraction," ranks a hierar-
chy of sources that a court should consider when attempting to
discern how a particular statute ought to be interpreted.
Eskridge and Frickey suggest that a court, when interpreting a
59 See, for example, Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev 321 (cited in note 13); Zep-
pos, 70 Tex L Rev 1074 (cited in note 14); Martineau, 62 Geo Wash L Rev 1 (cited in note
50).
60 Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 321-22 (cited in note 13), write
How do judges interpret statutes? How should they? Many commentators argue
that judicial interpretation is, or at least ought to be, inspired by grand theory.
We think these commentators are wrong, both descriptively and normatively:
Judges' approaches to statutory interpretation are generally eclectic, not in-
spired by any grand theory, and this is a good methodology. Stated another
way, we argue that foundationalism is a flawed strategy for theorizing about
statutory interpretation and that a more modest approach, grounded upon
'practical reason,' is both more natural and more useful.
61 See Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 327-44 (cited in note 13) (criticizing
each of the "grand theories" of statutory construction on a number of grounds).
62 Id at 353. Consider Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reasoning:
Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 Vand L Rev 533, 533 (1992) ("Practical
insight is like perceiving in the sense that it is non-inferential, non-deductive; it is, cen-
trally, the ability to recognize, acknowledge, respond to, pick out certain salient features
of a complex situation.").
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statute, statutory phrase, or key word, consider, in order from
strongest to weakest: (1) statutory text, (2) specific or general
legislative history, (3) legislative purpose, (4) evolution of the
statute, and (5) current policy. 63 Essentially, the Eskridge and
Frickey model boils down to two concepts: (1) an interpreter of
statutes should evaluate all available and relevant evidentiary
sources, and (2) once those sources have been evaluated, they
should be honestly discussed and compared as part of any judi-
cial opinion. 64
Eskridge and Frickey's model is both normatively appealing
and descriptively accurate. The model is normatively appealing
because it promotes judicial candor by placing the evidentiary
sources and the thought process of the judge in the open. This
sort of openness has value for future courts, legal practitioners,
and the public at large because it provides each of them guidance
when similar issues arise in the future.65 Eskridge and Frickey
find this sort of judicial openness particularly valuable. 66
63 According to Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 353-59 (cited in note 13),
(T]his model identifies the primary evidentiary inquiries in which the Court will
engage .... It is funnel-shaped for three reasons. First, the model suggests the
hierarchy of sources that the Court has in fact assumed. For example, in formu-
lating her preunderstanding of the statute and in testing it, the interpreter will
value more highly a good argument based on the statutory text than a conflict-
ing and equally strong argument based upon the statutory purpose. Second, the
model suggests the degree of abstraction at each source. The sources at the bot-
tom of the diagram involve more focused, concrete inquiries, typically with a
more limited range of arguments. As the interpreter moves up the diagram, a
broader range of arguments is available, partly because the inquiry is less con-
crete. Third, the model illustrates the pragmatistic and hermeneutical insights
explained above: In formulating and testing her understanding of the statute,
the interpreter will move up and down the diagram, evaluating and comparing
the different considerations represented by each source of argumentation.
64 Id at 353, 363.
65 David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 Harv L Rev 731, 750 (1987)
("[Tihe fidelity of judges to law can be fairly measured only if they believe what they say
in their opinions and orders, and thus a good case can be made that the obligation to
candor is absolute.").
66 Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 364 (cited in note 13), argue
[s]tatutory interpretation ought to ...acknowledg[e] that to admit that legal in-
terpretations often cannot be established according to clear objective criteria is
not to bestow upon the judge unconstrained freedom to reach any interpretation
she desires. If performed candidly and with emphatic appreciation for the point
of view of others ... the to and fro movements among the considerations sug-
gested by our practical reasoning mode is a more legitimate approach to statu-
tory interpretation than the supposedly 'objective' foundationalist approaches.
See also Farber, 45 Vand L Rev 533, 539-40 (cited in note 62) ("[P]ractical reason does
not mean-as is sometimes mistakenly thought-an embrace of ad hoc decisionmaking.
Rather, it means a rejection of the view that rules and precedents in and of themselves
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In addition to being normatively appealing, the practical
reasoning model presents a descriptively accurate picture of most
judges' statutory interpretation. In 1992 Professor Nicholas Zep-
pos published an empirical analysis on the use of evidentiary
authority in Supreme Court statutory construction cases from
1890-1990.67 Zeppos found that, in addition to more traditional
sources of statutory interpretation such as text or legislative his-
tory, practical considerations and public values play a remarka-
bly important role in Supreme Court statutory construction
cases.68 Based on this evidence and other findings throughout the
study, Zeppos concluded that, "[t]he court cites to a wide range of
authority to justify results in statutory cases .... [T]he Court's
approach is eclectic, relying not only on text and originalist
sources, but on practical considerations and other dynamic
sources as well."69 If the Supreme Court really is eclectic in its
use of evidentiary sources in statutory construction cases, then
courts of appeals should act likewise, considering and comparing
a variety of sources in reaching their ultimate conclusion.
Because of this approach's normative and positive value, this
Comment employs Eskridge and Frickey's practical model to
evaluate whether an attempted illegal reentry pursuant to
§ 1326 requires specific or general intent.
III. INTERPRETIVE METHODS OF
GRA CIDAS- ULIBARR Y & RODRIG UEZ
Though neither court's interpretive methodology is perfectly
in line with one of the "grand theories," the court in Gracidas-
Ulibarry appears to adopt a new textualist model, 70 while the
court in Rodriguez appears to adopt a contextual model, 71 basi-
cally a hybrid of intentionalism and purposivism.
dictate outcomes.").
67 See Zeppos, 70 Tex L Rev 1074 (cited in note 14).
68 Id at 1107-1108 ("The data reveal that practical considerations play an important
role in the Court's statutory cases. In 28.8% of the cases, the Court invoked a practical
consideration as support for its result.").
69 Id at 1120 (emphasis added).
70 See 231 F3d 1188, 1190, 1192-95 (9th Cir 2000).
71 See 416 F3d 123, 125-28 (2d Cir 2005).
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A. United States v Gracidas-Ulibarry
New textualist source choice and methodology fits well with
the actual method employed by the Gracidas-Ulibarry court.72 In
Gracidas-Ulibarry, the Ninth Circuit began its inquiry by look-
ing to the actual text of 8 USC § 1326; the court concluded that
Congress had not included a specific intent requirement in
§ 1326. 73 However, the court still attempted to resolve the appar-
ent ambiguity in § 1326 on textualist grounds, noting that
"[w]hen Congress has used a term that has a settled common law
meaning, 'a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dic-
tates, that Congress means to incorporate the established mean-
ing' of that term."74
The Ninth Circuit's reference to the common law, as an ex-
trinsic source to aid in statutory interpretation, is generally ac-
cepted by new textualists.7 5 This "canon" of statutory construc-
tion posits that "well-defined words and phrases in the common
law carr[y] over to statutes dealing with the same or similar sub-
ject matter."76 Reliance on the common law definition of terms is
particularly acceptable in the interpretation of criminal statutes,
where the crime is described by name only.77 In 8 USC § 1326,
72 In Gracidas-Ulibarry the Ninth Circuit does address some legislative history and
purposive arguments, which would be off the table for most, if not all, new textualists.
231 F3d at 1190-95. However, the bulk of the Ninth Circuit's opinion is spent discussing
the common law, dictionaries, and other sections of the Immigration and Nationality
Act-an inquiry that looks very new textualist in orientation.
73 231 F3d at 1193.
74 Id at 1193, quoting Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 21 (1999).
75 See Moskal v United States, 498 US 103, 121 (1990) (Scalia dissenting) ('[W]here
Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning
of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were
attached to each borrowed word .. "'), quoting Morissette v United States, 342 US 246,
263 (1952); Kungys v United States, 485 US 759, 770 (1988) (Scalia) ('Where Congress
uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under either equity or the common
law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to
incorporate the established meaning of these terms."'), quoting NLRB v Amax Coal Co,
453 US 322, 329 (1981). See also John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91
Va L Rev 419, 435 (2005) ("Textualists assign common-law terms their full array of com-
mon-law connotations.").
76 Norman J. Singer, 2B Sutherland Statutory Construction § 50:3 (6th ed 2006). See
also Community for Creative Non-Violence v Reid, 490 US 730, 739-40 (1989) (using the
common law of agency to determine the meaning of "employee" where Congress failed to
define the term); Gilbert v United States, 370 US 650, 655 (1962) ("[I]n absence of any-
thing to the contrary it is fair to assume that Congress used ['forges'] in the statute in its
common-law sense").
77 Singer, 2B Sutherland § 50:3 (cited in note 76). See also United States v Guilbert,
692 F2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir 1982) ("The term 'assault' is not defined by the statute, but
where a federal criminal statute uses a common law term without defining it, the term is
given its common law meaning.").
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the crime of attempted illegal reentry is described only by name,
without an explicit reference to the required mens rea. In such a
case, at least according to Gracidas-Ulibarry, the common law
understanding of the word ought to be incorporated into the
statute and therefore specific intent ought to be required for an
attempted illegal reentry. 78
The Gracidas-Ulibarry court also references Black's Law
Dictionary to bolster its textual argument, contending that an
attempt, unless otherwise defined, is always an offense requiring
a specific intent.79 Finally, the Gracidas-Ulibarry court discusses
other sections of the INA as evidence that Congress intended the
crime of attempted illegal reentry in § 1326 to require specific
intent, rather than general intent.8 0
While the Gracidas-Ulibarry court's opinion may not per-
fectly fit the mold of new textualism, the Ninth Circuit's choice of
sources, including the common law, dictionaries, and statutory
structure, indicates a strong adherence to that particular "grand
theory" of statutory interpretation.
B. United States v Rodriguez
Unlike the Gracidas-Ulibarry opinion, the Second Circuit in
Rodriguez is more contextual than textual in orientation.81 In
particular, both the "grand theories" of intentionalism and pur-
posivism appear to provide the interpretive framework for the
court's analysis of attempt in § 1326.
78 See Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F3d at 1192 (citing a number of cases which hold at
common law attempt crimes require specific intent).
79 Id, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 123-24 [sic] (West 7th ed 1999) ("Every attempt
is an act done with intent to commit the offence so attempted.") (quoted material from
Black's appears solely on page 123). As with references to the common law, new textual-
ists like Justice Scalia, often rely on dictionaries to aid in their interpretation of statutory
words or phrases. See, for example, MCI Telecommunications Corp v AT&T, 512 US 218,
225-28 (1994) (Scalia) (defining the word "modify" with reference to a number of diction-
ary definitions).
80 Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F3d at 1194. New textualists often look to the entire statu-
tory scheme as an aid in construing a particular word or phrase. See, for example, Green
v Bock Laundry Co, 490 US 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia concurring in judgment) ('The
meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined ... on the basis of which
meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage ... and (2) most compati-
ble with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated-a
compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind.").
81 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United States v Morales-Palacios, 369 F3d
442 (5th Cir 2004), adopts a contextual model of statutory interpretation, arguing that
"where a statute is silent as to intent, it becomes a question of legislative intent to be
construed by the court." Id at 446.
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In Rodriguez, the Second Circuit appears to adopt a hybrid
intentionalist/purposive model for construing the meaning of "at-
tempt" in § 1326.82 First, the Second Circuit explicitly looked to
the legislative history of § 1326 to give the statute's ambiguous
text, the definition of "attempt," a coherent reading.8 3 The court
concluded that there was nothing explicit in the legislative his-
tory that would suggest that Congress intended courts to adopt a
specific intent requirement for an attempted illegal reentry pur-
suant to § 1326.84
Next the court argued that "the legislative purpose served by
§ 1326 would be obstructed by the imposition of a heightened
mens rea standard in attempt prosecutions."8 5 This inquiry looks
like mixture of Judge Posner's intentionalist "imaginative recon-
struction," under which a judge attempts to give a statute a rea-
sonable interpretation based upon how she believes a reasonable
legislator would have addressed the issue,8 6 and a straight pur-
posivist approach. Implicit in the Second Circuit's opinion is the
argument that a reasonable legislator would not have required a
specific intent for a § 1326 attempted illegal reentry because
such a legislator would not have wished to undermine the overall
purpose of the statue, which is to keep previously deported aliens
from reentering the United States.
Both the Ninth Circuit in Gracidas-Ulibarry and the Second
Circuit in Rodriguez implicitly adopt one (or a hybrid of two) of
the "grand theories" of statutory construction as their interpreta-
tive framework; however, neither the textual nor the contextual
interpretation is entirely fulfilling from a normative or descrip-
tive standpoint.8 7
82 In Rodriguez, the Second Circuit does of course look to the statute's text, as well as
the common law and the structure of the statute. 416 F3d at 126-27. However, unlike the
Gracidas-Ulibarry court, which gave these sources significant weight, the Second Circuit
in Rodriguez gives more weight to the purposes and less to these "textualist" sources. Id
at 128. It is the weight the sources are given in the opinion, and not the lack of their
presence that leads me to classify the Rodriguez opinion as intentionalist/purposivist and
the Gracidas-Ulibarry opinion as new textualist.
83 Rodriguez, 416 F3d at 127.
84 Id ("[W]e see nothing in the plain language of the statute [§ 1326] or in its legisla-
tive history to persuade us that Congress intended to impose a heightened mens rea
requirement in cases of attempted reentry.").
85 Id.
86 See Posner, 50 U Chi L Rev at 817 (cited in note 45).
87 See Part II.
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IV. ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL REENTRY THROUGH THE
"FUNNEL OF ABSTRACTION"
The "funnel of abstraction" provides a more satisfactory in-
terpretation of the word "attempt" as used in § 1326 by challeng-
ing the interpreter to evaluate and compare the (1) statutory
text, (2) specific or general legislative history, (3) legislative pur-
pose, (4) evolution of the statute, and (5) current policy. The fol-
lowing section will compare and evaluate each of these sources to
determine whether specific or general intent should be the re-
quired mens rea for § 1326(a) attempted illegal reentries.
A. Statutory Text
Eskridge and Frickey's model begins with the "prevailing
Supreme Court assumption that the statutory text is the most
authoritative interpretive criterion."88 At this stage of inquiry the
court should first look to the specific words of the text, being sen-
sitive to "any special senses the words have acquired."8 9 In addi-
tion to looking at the specific words in the text, the court should
also consider "how the statutory provision at issue coheres with
the general structure of the statute, since other provisions in the
statute might shed light on the one being interpreted."90
As has been recognized by each of the appellate courts that
has considered the issue, the specific words of 8 USC § 1326 pro-
vide little guidance as to the mens rea required for an attempted
illegal reentry. Section 1326(a), provides in part:
[A]ny alien who-
(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or
removed.., and thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in,
the United States
shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than
2 years, or both.91
88 Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 354 (cited in note 13).
89 Id at 355.
90 Id.
91 8 USC § 1326(a) (2000).
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Both the Rodriguez and Gracidas-Ulibarry courts agree that
there is nothing in the plain language of 8 USC § 1326 that gives
explicit guidance as to the required mens rea.92 In Rodriguez, the
Second Circuit held that there was "nothing in the language ...
of section 1326 to support the proposition that the government
must prove specific intent. ' 93 Likewise, in Gracidas- Ulibarry, the
Ninth Circuit found that the text of § 1326 failed to provide any
specific indication of the mental element that Congress intended
for an attempted illegal reentry.94
While both courts agree that the plain language does not ex-
plicitly require general or specific intent, the Rodriguez court
leaves the plain language inquiry quickly and delves into issues
of legislative intent and statutory purpose. On the other hand,
the Gracidas-Ulibarry court attempts to resolve the issue by us-
ing a more limited universe of interpretive sources to define the
term "attempt," and in so doing, resolve the debate on textual
grounds without relying on legislative intent or statutory pur-
pose.
As mentioned previously, the Ninth Circuit in Gracidas-
Ulibarry uses both the common law and dictionary definitions to
give the word "attempt" a coherent meaning.95 From these
sources, the Ninth Circuit concludes that:
Although Congress did not include an explicit intent re-
quirement for the crime of illegal attempt to reenter in
§ 1326, the term 'attempts' implies the common law
meaning that includes specific intent. When Congress has
used a term that has a settled common law meaning, 'a
court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates,
92 See United States v Rodriguez, 416 F3d 123, 127 (2d Cir 2005); United States v
Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir 2000).
93 Rodriguez, 416 F3d at 127, quoting United States v Newton, 677 F2d 16, 17 (2d Cir
1982). The court in United States v Morales-Palacios, 369 F3d 442, 446 (5th Cir 2004)
(citations omitted), explains
In conducting statutory interpretation, we begin our inquiry with the plain lan-
guage of the statute. Here, the plain language of the statute provides little ex-
plicit guidance concerning the intent required for a violation. Under section
1326, the language simply states that a previously deported alien who 'enters,
attempts to enter, or is at any time found in' the United States without the ex-
press consent of the Attorney General is prohibited.
94 231 F3d at 1193 ("Congress did not include an explicit intent requirement for the
crime of illegal attempt to reenter in § 1326.").
95 Id at 1192-94 (discussing dictionaries, treatises, and common law cases, all of
which require a specific intent for attempt crimes).
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that Congress means to incorporate the established mean-
ing' of that term.96
Such deference to the common law meaning of statutory words
was explicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court in Morissette v
United States.97
Despite the support Morissette provides for the Gracidas-
Ulibarry opinion, the Ninth Circuit's reliance on the common law
is weakened by the Second Circuit's argument that since § 1326
was a statutory offense, and did not "enshrin[e] in statute a
common law offense", the word attempt was "liberated from [its]
common law meaning[]."98 This argument is based upon the Su-
preme Court opinion in United States v Balint,99 which held that
a court may refuse to apply the presumption of common law in-
tent to a statutory crime when such application would obstruct
the purpose of the statute. 100 The Balint exception, however, ap-
pears to be a narrow one. Not only must a court invoking Balint
clearly articulate a given statute's purpose, a difficult task in
itself, but the court must also argue that such a purpose is so
important that it ought to trump the typical practice of reading
terms in a statute in light of their common law meanings. A later
section will discuss the statutory purpose of § 1326 in greater
depth and will conclude that the purpose of the section is far
from clear. 10 1 Without a clear statutory purpose the general rule
of Morisette should trump the narrow exception of Balint.
In its textual inquiry the Ninth Circuit also addresses the
general structure of the INA as evidence that Congress intended
96 Id at 1193, quoting Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 21 (1999) (citations omitted).
See also NLRB v Amax Coal Co, 453 US 322 (1981) ("Where Congress uses terms that
have accumulated settled meaning under ... the common law, a court must infer, unless
the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established mean-
ing of these terms."); Standard Oil Co of NJ v United States, 221 US 1, 59 (1911)
("[W]here words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning
at common law or in the law of this country, they are presumed to have been used in that
sense.").
97 Morissette v United States, 342 US 246, 263 (1952) ("Wlhere Congress borrows
terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use
will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.") (emphasis added). The
holding regarding common law meanings in Morissette is particularly relevant because it
was handed down in 1952, the same year as the INA was enacted.
98 Rodriguez, 416 F3d at 126.
99 258 US 250 (1922).
100 Id at 251-52.
101 See Part IV C.
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the word "attempt" in § 1326 to require a specific intent.102 For
instance, in 8 USC §§ 1287, 1306(a), 1306(d), 1324, 1325, and
1328 Congress used terms such as "knowingly," "willfully,"
"unlawful intent," and "purpose," all of which suggest a specific
intent requirement. 10 3 However, in 8 USC §§ 1306(b), 1306(c),
1321, 1322, 1323, and 1326 Congress failed to explicitly provide
the intent required. 0 4 From this proposition the Ninth Circuit
argues that Congress felt the need to explicitly define the intent
level for actual crimes, but felt no need to define the intent re-
quired for attempt crimes because the common law has always
understood such attempt crimes to require specific intent.105 The
statutory structure argument in Gracidas-Ulibarry, essentially
boils down to the proposition that Congress needed to define the
intent level of actual crimes under the INA because there was no
guiding background principle for such regulatory crimes; Con-
gress, however, did not feel the same compulsion to explicitly
provide the intent level required for attempt crimes because the
common law understanding of attempt crimes provided the
background principle.
This statutory structure argument is not particularly con-
vincing. The Gracidas-Ulibarry argument that Congress did not
define intent in § 1326 because it believed intent was already
understood appears flawed in light of the unambiguous mens rea
provisions in other parts of the INA. The fact that Congress ex-
plicitly provided for specific intent in other parts of the INA may
suggest that it accepted general intent as the default intent for
crimes under the INA and chose to explicitly define specific in-
tent for the exceptions. Though the Rodriguez court does not ex-
plicitly address this statutory structure argument in its opinion,
it is a counter-argument worthy of discussion, particularly since
even the Ninth Circuit has recognized that a term explicitly in-
102 Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F3d at 1194 ("Congress included explicit intent require-
ments in other sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 that enacted
§ 1326. Unlike its use of the term 'enters' in § 1326 for the crime of illegal reentry, how-
ever, Congress's use of the term 'attempts' does not reflect silence as to intent but is con-
sistent with a purpose to 'adopt[] the cluster of ideas that were attached to [the] borrowed
word in the body of learning from which it was taken."'), quoting Morissette, 342 US at
263.
103 See 8 USC §§ 1287, 1306(a), 1306(d), 1324, 1325, 1328 (2005).
104 See 8 USC §§ 1306(b), 1306(c), 1321, 1322, 1323, 1326 (2005). Consider Pena-
Cabanillas v United States, 394 F2d 785, 789 & n 4 (9th Cir 1968) (providing the lan-
guage regarding intent from various sections of the INA).
105 Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F3d at 1194-95.
522 [2007:
THROUGH THE FUNNEL OF ABSTRACTION
cluded in one section of the statute should not be implicitly in-
cluded in another. 10 6
Both courts seem to posit plausible textual arguments in
their respective opinions, however, the Ninth Circuit's argu-
ments based on dictionaries and the common law have signifi-
cant appeal, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's holding
in cases like Morissette, that 'a court must infer, unless the
statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate
the established meaning"' of a common law term into the statu-
tory language. 10 7 While the Ninth Circuit offers strong plain lan-
guage arguments, its statutory structure arguments appear
weaker. In fact, the statutory structure appears to support the
Second Circuit position that general intent should be the default
mens rea required for an attempted illegal reentry pursuant to
§ 1326 unless there is clear congressional intent to the contrary.
If the text were the only source worthy of consideration in the
current split, then the Gracidas-Ulibarry opinion would be the
more convincing interpretation, despite its questionable struc-
tural arguments. Under Eskridge and Frickey's "funnel of ab-
straction," however, the inquiry does not end here.
B. Specific & General Legislative History
The next step under Eskridge & Frickey's "funnel of abstrac-
tion" is to look at the specific and general legislative history. At
this stage in the inquiry, the court should consider the "original
expectations of the Congress that enacted that statute."108 Ascer-
taining the "original expectations" of the enacting Congress in-
volves looking at the legislative history of the statute or, if the
legislative history is barren, conducting an "imaginative recon-
struction" of the legislative intent, looking to the "common law
rules when the statute was enacted [and] general assumptions of
law held by the enacting Congress."'10 9
As with the statutory text, both the Rodriguez and Gracidas-
Ulibarry courts agreed that the legislative history of § 1326 does
106 See Pena-Cabanillas, 394 F2d at 789 ("In construing statutes, words are to be
given their natural, plain, ordinary and commonly understood meaning unless it is clear
that some other meaning was intended... and where Congress has carefully employed a
term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.")
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
107 Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F3d at 1193, quoting Neder, 527 US at 21 (citations omit-
ted).
108 Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 356 (cited in note 13).
109 Id at 357.
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not explicitly provide any indication as to what mens rea is re-
quired for a conviction of an attempted illegal reentry. 110 Never-
theless, the courts read the lack of legislative history regarding
the required mens rea in remarkably different ways. The Rodri-
guez court argued that there was 'nothing in the language or
legislative history to support the proposition that the government
must prove specific intent."'1" In contrast, the Gracidas- Ulibarry
court argued that "[n]either the text of § 1326 nor its legislative
history gives any indication that Congress intended not to incor-
porate the common law meaning of the term 'attempts' into the
crime of attempted illegal reentry."'112 The difference between
these two readings of legislative silence is not particularly sur-
prising once each court's default presumption is understood. As
the Gracidas-Ulibarry court's textual arguments make clear, the
Ninth Circuit believed the common law meaning of "attempt"
should be incorporated into § 1326 unless there was clear evi-
dence to the contrary. 113 The Rodriguez court believed that the
purpose of the statute must be determined before the court could
determine whether or not Congress intended to incorporate the
common law meaning of the word "attempt" into the statute. 114
Since the legislative history provides no explicit reference to
intent, under Eskridge and Frickey's model the interpreter
should attempt to ascertain the legislature's intent by conducting
an "imaginative reconstruction."' 1 5 The Rodriguez court's "imagi-
native reconstruction" is more implicit than explicit and blends
almost seamlessly with their purposive arguments. Implicit in
the Second Circuit's opinion is the assumption that the 1952
Congress intended § 1326 to be as broad as possible to deter pre-
110 See Rodriguez, 416 F3d at 127 ("There is nothing in the language or legislative
history of section 1326 to support the proposition that the government must prove specific
intent.") (quotation omitted); Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F3d at 1193 (noting that "Congress
did not include an explicit intent requirement for the crime of illegal attempt to reenter in
§ 1326"). See also Pena-Cabanillas v United States, 394 F2d 785, 789 (9th Cir 1968) ('The
legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act, covered in the 1952 US Code
Cong and Adm News, p 1653, appears to be barren as to whether Congress meant to
include language inferring 'intent' in Section 276 of the Act, 8 USC Sec 1326.").
111 Rodriguez, 416 F3d at 127, quoting United States v Newton, 677 F2d 16, 17 (2d Cir
1982).
112 231 F3d at 1193 (emphasis added), citing HR Rep No 82-1365, 82nd Cong, 2d Sess
(1952), reprinted in 1952 USCCAN 1653, 1723-24.
113 Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F3d at 1193.
114 416 F3d at 127-28.
115 Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 357 (cited in note 13). Consider Posner, 50
U Chi L Rev at 817-20 (cited in note 45).
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viously deported aliens from reentering the United States. 116 Es-
sentially the argument is this: (1) Congress has the power to
wield broad discretion in the area of immigration; (2) keeping
illegal aliens from reentering the United States is the purpose of
the statute; (3) therefore, we must presume that Congress in-
tended to wield its full authority and adopt a broad prohibition
on reentry, which would require only general intent for convic-
tion of an attempted illegal reentry. 117 This reconstruction of leg-
islative intent, while plausible, is proffered by the Second Circuit
without any tangible support for why they believe Congress in-
tended to exercise their prerogative to "define offenses in the
area of immigration" in a new and unusual manner.
The Ninth Circuit's "imaginative reconstruction" is more de-
fensible. According to the Ninth Circuit in Gracidas-Ulibarry,
attempt crimes have a long history of being understood to re-
quire specific intent. 118 In light of this extensive history, it would
be surprising for the 1952 Congress to do away with the back-
ground understanding that specific intent is required in attempt
crimes without addressing it explicitly, either in the text or the
legislative history of § 1326.119 This clear statement rule cuts in
favor of the "imaginative reconstruction" found Gracidas-
Ulibarry, which argues that the common law meaning of "at-
tempt" ought to be adopted unless it is clear that Congress in-
tended otherwise. In the case of § 1326, Congress provided no
such clarity, suggesting a Congressional intent to accept the
116 See Rodriguez, 416 F3d at 127 ("This increased danger of conviction imposes added
deterrent force, encouraging deported aliens to take additional care should they seek to
reenter by limiting the universe of defenses that might be advanced by those who do not
meet the requirements for legal reentry .... This enhancement of risk is well within the
broad discretion of Congress to define offenses in the area of immigration.") (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
117 Id at 126-27.
11s 231 F3d at 1192. See Wooldridge v United States, 237 F 775, 778-79 (9th Cir 1916)
(collecting common law sources "holding that, to constitute an attempt, there must be the
intent to commit a crime and some act done toward its consummation, and that the term
'attempt' signifies both an act and the intent with which it is done.") (emphasis added).
119 See Chisom v Roemer, 501 US 380, 396 n 23 (1991) ("Congress' silence in this re-
gard can be likened to the dog that did not bark."). See also Harrison v PPG Industries,
Inc, 446 US 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist dissenting) ("In a case where the construction of
legislative language such as this makes so sweeping and so relatively unorthodox a
change as made here, I think judges as well as detectives may take into consideration the
fact that the watchdog did not bark in the night.") (emphasis added); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium, 108 Harv L Rev 26, 101 (1994) (A "prior legal rule should be retained if no
one in legislative deliberations even mentioned the rule or discussed any changes in the
rule.").
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common law background principles of requiring specific intent
for conviction of an attempt crime.
C. Legislative Purpose
At the third stage in the "funnel of abstraction" a court at-
tempts to determine the legislative purpose. In other words, the
court should ask "[w]hat problem was Congress trying to solve,
and what general goals did it set forth in trying to solve it?"120
The plain text of § 1326 suggests that the most basic purpose of
the provision was to keep previously deported aliens from reen-
tering the United States illegally. 121 This purpose was to be ac-
complished by attaching fines and/or imprisonment to both at-
tempted and actual illegal reentries. 122
In Rodriguez, the Second Circuit appears to believe that this
statutory purpose can only be obtained by attaching significant
penalties to actual and potential violations of § 1326, even if such
a broad reading would be over-inclusive. The court argued that it
believed that the "legislative purpose served by § 1326 would be
obstructed by the imposition of a heightened mens rea standard
in attempt prosecutions."'123 In support of its purposive interpre-
tation, the Second Circuit put forth three distinct arguments: (1)
a broad purpose is most in line with the text of § 1326; (2) a
broad inclusive reading of purpose, one requiring only general
intent, is necessary to deter an alien from attempting reentry;
and (3) a broad reading is acceptable because it will not be a trap
for the unwary-deported aliens know that reentry or attempted
illegal reentry is a crime. First, the court argued that a broad
purposive reading was appropriate in light of the text of § 1326,
stating that "[the court] read[s] § 1326 to mean what it says: A
previously deported alien who reenters the United States does so
at his or her peril, and any subjective belief as to the legality of
that act is irrelevant."'' 24
Next, the court reasoned that an increased danger of convic-
tion, which would exist under a general intent regime, would
"impose[] added deterrent force, encouraging deported aliens to
120 Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 358 (cited in note 13).
121 See 8 USC § 1326(a)-(b) (2000).
122 Id.
123 Rodriguez, 416 F3d at 127.
124 Id, quoting United States v Champegnie, 925 F2d 54, 55-56 (2d Cir 1991). See also
United States v Torres-Echavarria, 129 F3d 692, 698 (2d Cir 1997) ('The statute simply,
and logically, makes the presumption of unlawful intent conclusive.").
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take additional care should they seek to reenter by limiting the
universe of defenses that might be advanced by those who do not
meet the requirements for legal reentry." 125 The court went on to
contend that a heightened mens rea would "erode[] significantly"
the deterrent force of § 1326 "because increased peril [of convic-
tion] would attach only on successful reentry, imposing only re-
mote force at the moment of decision." 126
Finally, the Second Circuit argued that a broad purposive
reading of § 1326 would not implicate truly innocent conduct,
because the continued "practice of the [Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service] is to advise [deported aliens] that they face
criminal liability for an unlawful return."'127 This final claim is
perhaps the strongest argument in the entire Rodriguez opinion.
At common law, one of the primary reasons for requiring specific
intent for attempt crimes was to protect truly innocent conduct
from being swept up with blameworthy conduct.128 In the case of
an attempted illegal reentry, the chance of this happening is re-
duced significantly by the practice of the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service ("INS") of advising an alien upon deportation
that any reentry without the express permission of the Attorney
General is illegal.
The Ninth Circuit, in Gracidas-Ulibarry, did not find that
the INS's practice of warning deported aliens of the risks of reen-
try solved the potential problem of sweeping innocent conduct up
with blameworthy conduct. One of the primary concerns found in
the Gracidas-Ulibarry opinion is separating illegal conduct from
innocent conduct.1 29 Specifically, the court worried that if at-
tempted illegal reentry were a general intent crime, then an im-
migrant, intercepted on his way to request permission to reapply
125 Rodriguez, 416 F3d at 127.
126 Id.
127 Id at 128, quoting Torres-Echavarria, 129 F3d at 697-98. A similar argument was
made by the Fifth Circuit in United States v Morales-Palacios, 369 F3d 442, 448 (5th Cir
2004) ("[flnder section 1326 a specific intent requirement is unnecessary, because the
regulatory nature of the statute makes the presumption of unlawful intent conclusive. A
previously deported alien has a unique set of knowledge that might not otherwise exist for
defendants in traditional common law crimes; upon being deported, an alien has been
given both oral and written notice that he or she cannot reenter without the express per-
mission of the Attorney General. The act of attempting to reenter therefore speaks for
itself.") (emphasis added).
128 See Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law at 379 (cited in note 23). See also
Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F3d at 1194.
129 231 F3d at 1194 ("On the face of it, the common law justification for requiring
specific intent for an attempt crime appears applicable to attempted illegal reentry; oth-
erwise, lawful conduct could be swept within the proscription of the statute.").
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for admission to the United States, could be prosecuted pursuant
to § 1326.130 In fact, this is exactly what happened in United
States v Morales-Tovar,131 where the District Court for the West-
ern District of Texas dismissed charges against the defendant
because the court could not determine if the defendant was at-
tempting an illegal reentry or legally requesting permission to
apply for readmission. 132
The Ninth Circuit, in Gracidas-Ulibarry, seized on the
analysis in Morales-Tovar to conclude "Congress may have had a
good reason to incorporate the common law meaning of attempt
into the crime of attempted illegal reentry under § 1326."133 In
the Ninth Circuit's opinion this incorporation of the common law
meaning was warranted regardless of the INS's warning that
reentry was illegal, because even if an alien understood actual
reentry to be illegal, they could still be prosecuted for an at-
tempted reentry simply by following the prescription of 8 CFR
§ 212.2(f), which provides a legal method for obtaining reentry to
the United States. 134
Both courts' arguments regarding legislative purpose appear
plausible, however, neither explanation is wholly convincing be-
cause both make potentially unwarranted assumptions. The
Rodriguez argument, regarding the INS practice of warning de-
130 Id.
131 37 F Supp 2d 846, 846-49 (W D Tex 1999). In Morales-Tovar, the defendant was
arrested when he approached a port of entry in Del Rio Texas. Id at 848. The government
alleged that Morales-Tovar wanted to replace his resident alien card, and that such an
action amounted to an attempt to enter the United States. Id. Counsel for the defendant
argued that Morales-Tovar was abiding by the law by going to the port of entry to find out
what he had to do in order to legally reenter the United States. Id at 849. The court held
that "at best, [it was] faced with alternative, plausible explanations." Id. On the one hand,
it was clear that the defendant had not received the express consent of the Attorney Gen-
eral; on the other hand, the defendant's actions may have been innocent and in accor-
dance with the federal regulation promulgated to allow an alien to reapply for permission
to reenter the United States. Id.
132 Id at 851 (finding that a general intent requirement would make "any proactive
attempt to follow th[e] legally sanctioned and required procedure" for obtaining reentry
into the United States illegal).
133 Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F3d at 1194 ("If attempted illegal reentry were a general
intent crime, a previously deported alien intercepted on the way to, or even at, the port of
entry to make such a request or to pick up the forms could be prosecuted under § 1326.
True, the alien could try to explain that his or her intent was to comply with the law, not
violate it; but the government would not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the alien's true purpose was to break the law.").
134 8 CFR § 212.2(f) (2005) ("Within five years of the deportation or removal, or twenty
years in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, an alien may request per-
mission at a port of entry to reapply for admission to the United States. The alien shall file
the Form 1-212 with the district director having jurisdiction over the port of entry.") (em-
phasis added).
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ported aliens of the risks of reentry, assumes that deported
aliens actually understand the warnings they are being given.
Certainly, most deported aliens understand that an actual reen-
try is illegal, but what they may not understand is the risk of
imprisonment they face for a "good faith" attempt to seek per-
mission to reenter the United States. This issue is even more
confusing and potentially problematic for aliens given the pres-
ence of federal regulations that provide a method for deported
aliens to seek to reenter the United States legally.135 Given the
potential confusion due to the presence of such regulations, the
Rodriguez argument that all aliens understand the risks of at-
tempting to reenter the United States is less convincing.
Unlike the Rodriguez opinion, which may assume too much
about an alien's ability to understand the implications of the INS
warning and its interaction with federal regulations, the Graci-
das- Ulibarry opinion may assume too little about the expertise of
border officials and the limiting effects of prosecutorial discre-
tion. Both the Morales-Tovar and Gracidas-Ulibarry court ap-
pear to assume that officials and prosecutors are incapable of
using their expertise to distinguish between illegal and legal
conduct and, therefore, such discretion should be limited by re-
quiring specific intent for conviction of an attempted illegal reen-
try. While such an assumption may be crude, fear that overbur-
dened border officials wield excessive discretion over potential
immigration violations is not too farfetched-especially in light
of federal regulations, which give broad discretion to border offi-
cials in determining when and how to pursue potential criminal
violations. 136 Given this broad grant of discretion, the Gracidas-
Ulibarry fear that innocent conduct may be swept up with illegal
conduct, unless specific intent is required for an illegal entry
conviction, is understandable.
D. Evolution of Statute
The next inquiry in the "funnel of abstraction" looks to the
evolution of the statue.137 The penalty for illegal reentry "origi-
135 See id.
136 See 8 CFR § 287.2 (2005) ("Whenever a special agent in charge, port director, or
chief patrol agent has reason to believe that there has been a violation punishable under
any criminal provision of the immigration and nationality laws.., he or she shall imme-
diately initiate an investigation to determine all the pertinent facts and circumstances
and shall take such further action as he or she deems necessary.") (emphasis added).
137 See Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 359 (cited in note 13) ("The enactment
of a statute is often the beginning of a significant process of implementation by courts or
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nated in 1929 and was carried forward in the 1952 codification of
the Immigration and Nationality Act" at 8 USC § 1326.138 Most of
the conduct addressed and penalties prescribed under § 1326
have remained fairly static since the 1952 codification. However,
since the codification of the INA in 1952, the penalties for illegal
reentries have increased dramatically in certain circumstances.
Recent legislation has created specific penalties for aliens who:
(1) illegally renter the United States after having been deported
pursuant to INA § 212(a)(3)(B) for suspected terrorist activity, (2)
illegally reenter the United States after being deported pursuant
to the alien terrorist provisions of INA §§ 501-507, or (3) reenter
after having been released from incarceration and removed by
the Attorney General pursuant to INA § 241(a)(4)(B). l3 9 Aliens
who reenter or attempt to reenter in violation of any of these
three provisions can be fined, imprisoned for up to ten years, or
both.140
Those circuits supporting a general intent requirement, such
as the Rodriguez court, may read this statutory evolution to indi-
cate an increased commitment on the part of Congress to keep
previously deported aliens out of the United States. Though not
addressed in the context of the evolution of the statute, both the
Rodriguez and Morales-Palacios opinions stress that one of the
primary reasons why a general intent requirement should govern
attempted illegal reentries is to provide strong disincentives to
keep aliens, particularly dangerous aliens, out of the United
States.141 Supporters of a general intent standard could argue
that the statutory evolution, namely the broadened scope of pen-
alties for illegal reentries, suggests Congress's desire to deter
aliens from reentry and that such deterrence would be best
served by instituting a general intent mens rea for attempted
illegal reentries.
This argument, that Congress has sought to expand the pro-
tective scope of § 1326, is not particularly persuasive primarily
because § 1326 has not been substantively altered since its codi-
agencies. Implementation changes the statute, because the statute must be applied-and
often subtly redirected-to meet variations of the problem not originally anticipated.").
138 Stephen Yale-Loehr and Rachel J. Valente, Current Trends in Illegal Reentry
Cases, 3 Thomas M Cooley J Prac & Clinical L 1, 2 (1999).
139 See id at 2.
140 8 USC § 1326(b) (2000).
141 See, for example, Morales-Palacios, 369 F3d 442, 448 (5th Cir 2004) ("[We must
exhibit extreme caution in allowing criminal defendants charged with regulatory crimes
to utilize a mistake of fact defense where the mere illegal conduct may seriously threaten
the community's health or safety .... ).
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fication in 1952. In fact, the language of § 1326(a), which makes
attempted illegal reentry a crime, as well as the penalties pro-
vided for such a crime, has remained almost entirely unchanged
since 1952.142 This suggests that Congress's general intentions
regarding the conviction and punishment of attempted illegal
reentry have not changed since 1952, despite the fact that it has
provided more specific penalties for certain types of deportees,
for example, those convicted or suspected of terrorist activity.
Thus, in the present case, the inquiry into the statutory evo-
lution of § 1326 should be treated as a non-factor in the "funnel
of abstraction" inquiry, since it supports neither a specific or
general intent requirement for attempted illegal reentry. Rather,
the lack of statutory evolution makes the inquiry into the origi-
nal text, intent, and purpose of the statute all the more relevant.
E. Current Policy & Values
At the final stage of inquiry in the "funnel of abstraction" a
court considers current American policy and values, including
inquiries into "ideas of fairness, related statutory policies, and
(most important) constitutional values." 143 Current values con-
tinue to affect judicial decisions at all levels of the federal bench,
though most often in implicit rather than explicit ways.144 One
example of reliance on current values came in Bob Jones Univer-
sity v United States,145 where the Court denied tax-exempt status
to Bob Jones University, in part, because it engaged in racial dis-
crimination in violation of current public values.146 Values, such
142 See INA § 276, 66 Stat at 229, codified at 8 USC § 1326(a) (1952), which provides
Any alien who--(1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported,
and thereafter (2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the
United States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the
United States or his application for admission from foreign contiguous territory,
the Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for
admission; or (B) with respect to an alien previously excluded or deported,
unless such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain such ad-
vance consent under this or any prior Act, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon
conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment of not more than two years, or
by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
143 Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 359 (cited in note 13).
144 Consider William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U Pa L
Rev 1479, 1538 (1987) (noting that "the current context and public values always exercise
some influence on the interpretive enterprise").
145 461 US 574 (1983).
146 Id at 592-95 ("We are bound to approach these questions with full awareness that
determinations of public benefit and public policy are sensitive matters with serious im-
plications for the institutions affected; a declaration that a given institution is not 'chari-
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as those discussed in Bob Jones, should be examined and dis-
cussed as a part of any judicial opinion under the Eskridge and
Frickey framework, even if those values ultimately play a minor
rule in the decision. 147 Neither the Rodriguez nor Gracidas-
Ulibarry court discusses current values as part of their respec-
tive opinions, but there are a number of current policy and val-
ues arguments that could be legitimately attributed to the posi-
tion each court supports.
The Rodriguez court advocates adopting only a general in-
tent mens rea for attempted illegal reentries. Implicit in this
holding is the belief that America ought to expand its efforts to
keep aliens who have been previously deported out of the country
by allowing the government to bear less prosecutorial burden in
attempted reentry cases. 148 This belief that "more needs to be
done" to counteract illegal immigration into America is shared by
a majority of Americans. 149
A June 24-27, 2006 public opinion poll conducted by the Los
Angeles Times/Bloomberg, found that 87 percent of those polled
thought that "[c]ompared to other problems facing the country,"
immigration was either "one of the most important" or "impor-
tant."150 A CNN poll conducted a few months later, between Sep-
table' should be made only where there can be no doubt that the activity involved is con-
trary to a fundamental public policy. But there can no longer be any doubt that racial
discrimination in education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary
justice."). See also Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 578 (2005) (Recognizing in the context
of the juvenile death penalty that it is "proper that [the Court] acknowledge the over-
whelming weight of international opinion" and noting that "[tihe opinion of the world
community, while not controlling [the Court's] outcome, does provide respected and sig-
nificant confirmation for [the Court's] conclusions.") (citations omitted); Church of the
Holy Trinity v United States, 143 US 457, 465-71 (1892) ("[N]o purpose of action against
religion can be imputed to any legislation, state or national, because this is a religious
people.").
147 See Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 358 (cited in note 13) ('These are
highly abstract inquiries [statutory evolution and current policy] having less connection
to text and legislative expectations, and hence less authority in a democracy. Yet these
inquiries are pertinent, because the enactment of statutes is part of the dynamic proc-
ess.").
148 See Rodriguez, 416 F3d at 127 ('"A previously deported alien who reenters the
United States does so at his or her peril, any subjective belief as to the legality of that act
is irrelevant.' This increased danger of conviction imposes added deterrent force, encour-
aging deported aliens to take additional care should they seek to reenter."), quoting
United States v Champegnie, 925 F2d 54, 55 (2d Cir 1991).
149 See PollingReport.com (Polling Report Inc 2006), Quinnipac University Poll, Nov
13-19, 2006, available at <http://www.pollingreport.com/immigration.htm> (last visited
Apr 27, 2007) (In poll asking whether or not more measures need to be taken to prevent
illegal immigration, 71% said more needed.).
150 Id, Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg Poll, June 24-27, 2006 (Poll: "Compared to other
problems facing the country, how big a problem is illegal immigration? Would you say it
is one of the most important problems facing the country, or is it an important problem
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tember 29, 2006 and October 10, 2006, asked whether the voter
"would favor or oppose building a fence along 700 miles of the
border with Mexico?" and found that 54 percent of the roughly
one thousand adults polled said they would be in favor of such a
measure. 151 Finally, a Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll, con-
ducted between May 16-18, 2006 found that 79 percent of those
polled believed that the government should "increas[e] the num-
ber of federal agents patrolling the border to stop illegal immi-
gration," and 63 percent said they favored "[u]sing thousands of
National Guard troops temporarily to help border patrol agents
along the Mexican border to stop illegal immigration."' 152 These
polls suggest that Americans in 2006 believed that immigration
was an important issue, and a majority wished to take increased
measures to crack down on illegal immigration, even extreme
measures like building a seven hundred mile fence or using the
National Guard to defend America's borders.
The United States government seems to be responding to the
majority and has been taking increasingly serious measures to
stem the flow of immigration. On October 26, 2006, President
Bush signed into law a bill that would provide for the construc-
tion of a fence along the Southwestern border, as well as an in-
creased number of vehicle barriers and checkpoints.1 53 This de-
sire for greater immigration deterrence is not a new phenome-
but not one of the most important, or is it not all that important, or is it not important at
all?" Answers: One of the most important= 32%; Important = 55%; Not all that important
= 8%; Not Important at All = 5%).
151 Id, CNN Poll conducted by Opinion Research Corporation, Sept 29-Oct 2, 2006
(Poll: "Now thinking about immigration, would you favor or oppose building a fence along
700 miles of the border with Mexico?" Answers: Favor = 54%; Oppose = 44%; Unsure =
2%).
152 Id, FOX News/Opinion Dynamics Poll, May 16-18, 2006 (Poll: 'There have been
several proposals regarding how to deal with the issue of illegal immigration. Please tell
me if you favor or oppose each of the following... (1) Increasing the number of federal
agents patrolling the border to stop illegal immigration?" Answer: Favor = 79%; Oppose =
17%; Depends = 2%; Unsure = 2%). (2) "Using thousands of National Guard troops tempo-
rarily to help border agents along the Mexican border to stop illegal immigration?" An-
swer: Favor = 63%; Oppose = 31%; Depends = 3%; Unsure = 3%).
153 Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub L No 109-367, 120 Stat 2638 (2006). Following the
signing of the bill, the President, in a statement to lawmakers, remarked, "[o]urs is a
nation of immigrants. We're also a nation of law. Unfortunately, the United States has
not been in complete control of its borders for decades and, therefore, illegal immigration
has been on the rise. We have a responsibility to address these challenges. We have a
responsibility to enforce our laws. We have a responsibility to secure our borders. We take
this responsibility seriously." President Bush Signs Secure Fence Act, (Press Release Oct
26, 2006) (White House 2006), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2006/10/20061026.html> (last visited Apr 27, 2007). See also Stephen Dinan, Bush Signs
the Fence Bill: Measure Boosts Agents, Pays for Border Barrier, Wash Times Al (Oct 5,
2006).
534 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2007:
non, but has been an increased concern of Congress since the
late-1980s.154
The Rodriguez court, given what appears to be consensus
amongst the majority of Americans and Congress that illegal
immigration must be reduced, may stand on firm grounds in ar-
guing that a general intent standard is the more appropriate
mens rea for attempted illegal reentries. Such a standard would
make it easier for the government to prosecute those who at-
tempt a reentry, and therefore might provide a greater deterrent
effect on those who are considering attempting to reenter the
United States illegally. Although this may be true, such a "cur-
rent policy" position would contravene a long held policy of
American criminal law, which requires ambiguous statutes, like
§ 1326, to be read in favor of the defendant. 155
This "long held policy" of American criminal law, known as
the rule of lenity, posits that "penal statutes should be strictly
construed against the government or parties seeking to enforce
statutory penalties and in favor of the persons on whom penal-
ties are sought to be imposed."156 This rule has been applied in
the immigration context on a number of occasions. 157 With regard
to § 1326, the language of the statute is ambiguous, or at least
involves conceptual difficulties.15 8 The main conceptual difficulty
154 See Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the
New Penology, 17 Georgetown Immig L J 611 (2003) (arguing that since the late-1980s
the United States government has engaged in a "criminalization of immigration," which
has sought to increase punishment in order to keep future illegal immigrants out of the
United States and punish those who have previously entered illegally).
155 See Singer, 2B Sutherland § 59:3 (cited in note 76).
156 Id. For a general discussion, see Lawrence Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40
Wm & Mary L Rev 57 (1998) (discussing in depth the origins of the rule of lenity, when it
is applied, and its justifications).
157 See, for example, INS v St Cyr, 533 US 289, 320 (2001) (applying the rule of lenity
to buttress the presumption against retroactive application of ambiguous statutory provi-
sions); INS v Elias-Zacarias, 502 US 478, 487 (1992) (Stevens dissenting) (quoting the
Court's decisions directing lower courts to apply the rule of lenity in the immigration
context); INS v Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421, 449 (1987) (acknowledging 'longstanding
principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the
[noncitizen]."); INS v Errico, 385 US 214, 225 (1966) (stating that "[e]ven if there were
some doubt as to the correct construction of the statute, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the [noncitizen]."); Costello v INS, 376 US 120 (1964) (noting that even if the
statutory interpretation issue before the Court was in doubt it "would nonetheless be
constrained by accepted principles of statutory construction in this area of the law to
resolve that doubt in favor of the [noncitizen]."); Bonetti v Rogers, 356 US 691, 699 (1958)
(arguing that "ambiguity [in immigration statutes] should be resolved in favor of lenity").
Consider Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17
Georgetown Immig L J 515 (2003) (advocating the use of the "immigration rule of lenity,"
and suggesting the rule is consistent with Chevron and good public policy).
158 See Solan, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev at 63 (cited in note 156) (arguing that the rule of
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is, of course, whether to read § 1326's use of the word "attempt"
to indicate that general or specific intent is required for an at-
tempted illegal reentry. As the preceding sections of this Com-
ment have illustrated, this really is a conceptually difficult ques-
tion, with persuasive textual, historical, and purposive argu-
ments on both sides. Given this conceptual difficulty and lack of
clarity over the required mens rea, the rule of lenity could be le-
gitimately applied to the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of § 1326
and the word "attempt."159
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the current societal
policy and values relating to § 1326 are not clear. On the one
hand, those supporting a general intent requirement, such as the
Rodriguez court, could argue that current American policy is to
keep previously deported aliens excluded, even if some "innocent"
behavior is punished. On the other hand, supporters of a specific
intent standard, like the Ninth Circuit in Gracidas-Ulibarry,
could argue that it is the continued policy of American courts to
construe ambiguous immigration statutes that criminalize be-
havior in favor of the defendant.160
F. Through the Funnel: Resolving the Circuit Split
This Comment illustrates that there is no easy answer as to
whether illegal reentry is a crime requiring specific or general
intent. The supporters of a specific intent standard, like the court
in Gracidas-Ulibarry, possess particularly compelling textual
and legislative history arguments, while the supporters of a gen-
eral intent requirement, like the Rodriguez court, make strong
purposive and policy arguments. Although both sides make com-
lenity, although often expressed as a way to resolve "ambiguity," is most often used to
help resolve "conceptual difficulties").
159 See Moskal v United States, 498 US 103, 108 (1990) (The rule of lenity should be
reserved "for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's scope
even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating poli-
cies of the statute").
160 Although the "immigration rule of lenity" is most often applied in deportation
cases, it has been applied to a number of other immigration issues, which suggests its
application to attempted illegal reentries may be appropriate. See, for example, St Cyr,
533 US at 320 (2001) (applying the rule of lenity to determinations of whether immigra-
tion statutes apply retroactively); Detroit Free Press v Ashcroft, 303 F3d 681, 702 (6th Cir
2002) (applying deference in favor of immigrant to provisions governing the closing of
deportation hearings to the public). See also Slocum, 17 Georgetown Immig L J at 523
(cited in note 157) ("Despite the seemingly restrictive language used by courts in describ-
ing the immigration rule of lenity as applying to 'deportation provisions,' the rule has
been applied in a broader fashion .... to a wide variety of statutory provisions ... ").
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pelling arguments, the Ninth Circuit in Gracidas- Ulibarry pre-
sents the more persuasive case.
The Ninth Circuit in Gracidas- Ulibarry engages most di-
rectly with the text of § 1326 and with the intentions of the en-
acting Congress, making a number of convincing arguments
about the background presumptions regarding the required mens
rea for attempt crimes at common law. 61 The Ninth Circuit also
offers a plausible alternative to the purposive arguments of Rod-
riguez and Morales-Palacios; this argument suggests that while
the purpose of § 1326 is to keep previously deported immigrants
from reentering the United States, it is not intended to be a trap
for those who are not intending to act illegally. Finally, even if
these arguments are not completely convincing, at the very least,
they cast a significant degree of doubt upon the majority position
which advocates a general intent standard for § 1326 attempted
illegal reentries. In light of this ambiguity, a court faced with the
question of whether an attempted illegal reentry is a crime re-
quiring specific or general intent should, pursuant to the rule of
lenity, resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant. Such a
resolution would mean adopting a specific intent standard for
§ 1326 attempted reentries.
CONCLUSION
This Comment addresses a wide range of available argu-
ments to answer a question that continues to divide the circuits.
Both the Rodriguez and Gracidas-Ulibarry courts make strong
interpretative arguments in their respective opinions about
whether an attempted illegal reentry should be a crime of gen-
eral or specific intent. Neither court, however, treats the totality
of sources and arguments in a fully honest and transparent
manner. Using Eskridge and Frickey's "funnel of abstraction,"
this comment provides an honest and transparent discussion of
the interpretive sources pertaining to § 1326 attempted reen-
tries.
This Comment recognizes that statutory interpretation is of-
ten difficult, and that, when Congress employs ambiguous terms
in statutes, courts are often left to determine the meaning of
those terms without any formal guidance. Unfortunately for
scholars, practitioners, and those subject to the statutes, courts
often determine the meaning of the ambiguous term and then
161 See Part IV.
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justify the result by selectively presenting evidence in a way that
compromises judicial candor. 162 This Comment rejects this ap-
proach and instead compares arguments from both sides in order
to reach a more accurate and transparent statutory interpreta-
tion of § 1326.
This accurate and transparent method of interpretation
supports the understanding advocated by the Ninth Circuit in
Gracidas-Ulibarry that specific intent should be the required
mens rea for attempted illegal reentries.
162 See Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev at 363 (cited in note 13) ("TIThe [Su-
preme] Court's opinions show a distressing tendency to overstate the case for the result
that a majority of the Justices prefer, and to suppress the legitimate arguments cutting in
a different direction. This is distressing, because the full advantages of a practical reason-
ing approach cannot be realized without a candid 'to and fro' play among the various
interpretive considerations.").
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